ADR-003 wiring: Bearer token + IP allowlist middleware
Implements the auth posture from ADR-003 (commit0d18ffa). Two independent layers — Bearer token (constant-time compare via crypto/subtle) and IP allowlist (CIDR set) — composed in shared.Run so every binary inherits the same gate without per-binary wiring. Together with the bind-gate from commit6af0520, this mechanically closes audit risks R-001 + R-007: - non-loopback bind without auth.token = startup refuse - non-loopback bind WITH auth.token + override env = allowed - loopback bind = all gates open (G0 dev unchanged) internal/shared/auth.go (NEW) RequireAuth(cfg AuthConfig) returns chi-compatible middleware. Empty Token + empty AllowedIPs → pass-through (G0 dev mode). Token-only → 401 Bearer mismatch. AllowedIPs-only → 403 source IP not in CIDR set. Both → both gates apply. /health bypasses both layers (load-balancer / liveness probes shouldn't carry tokens). CIDR parsing pre-runs at boot; bare IP (no /N) treated as /32 (or /128 for IPv6). Invalid entries log warn and drop, fail-loud-but- not-fatal so a typo doesn't kill the binary. Token comparison: subtle.ConstantTimeCompare on the full "Bearer <token>" wire-format string. Length-mismatch returns 0 (per stdlib spec), so wrong-length tokens reject without timing leak. Pre-encoded comparison slice stored in the middleware closure — one allocation per request. Source-IP extraction prefers net.SplitHostPort fallback to RemoteAddr-as-is for httptest compatibility. X-Forwarded-For support is a follow-up when a trusted proxy fronts the gateway (config knob TBD per ADR-003 §"Future"). internal/shared/server.go Run signature: gained AuthConfig parameter (4th arg). /health stays mounted on the outer router (public). Registered routes go inside chi.Group with RequireAuth applied — empty config = transparent group. Added requireAuthOnNonLoopback startup check: non-loopback bind with empty Token = refuse to start (cites R-001 + R-007 by name). internal/shared/config.go AuthConfig type added with TOML tags. Fields: Token, AllowedIPs. Composed into Config under [auth]. cmd/<svc>/main.go × 7 (catalogd, embedd, gateway, ingestd, queryd, storaged, vectord, mcpd is unaffected — stdio doesn't bind a port) Each call site adds cfg.Auth as the 4th arg to shared.Run. No other changes — middleware applies via shared.Run uniformly. internal/shared/auth_test.go (12 test funcs) Empty config pass-through, missing-token 401, wrong-token 401, correct-token 200, raw-token-without-Bearer-prefix 401, /health always public, IP allowlist allow + reject, bare IP /32, both layers when both configured, invalid CIDR drop-with-warn, RemoteAddr shape extraction. The constant-time comparison is verified by inspection (comments in auth.go) plus the existence of the passthrough test (length-mismatch case). Verified: go test -count=1 ./internal/shared/ — all green (was 21, now 33 funcs) just verify — vet + test + 9 smokes 33s just proof contract — 53/0/1 unchanged Smokes + proof harness keep working without any token configuration: default Auth is empty struct → middleware is no-op → existing tests pass unchanged. To exercise the gate, operators set [auth].token in lakehouse.toml (or, per the "future" note in the ADR, via env var). Closes audit findings: R-001 HIGH — fully mechanically closed (was: partial via bind gate) R-007 MED — fully mechanically closed (was: design-only ADR-003) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -48,14 +48,28 @@ type RegisterRoutes func(r chi.Router)
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// (Per Kimi review #4: shared library functions shouldn't silently
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// mutate package globals.)
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//
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// Refuses to bind a non-loopback address unless the
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// LH_<SERVICE>_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK=1 env is set — closes the accidental
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// 0.0.0.0 deploy path for R-001 (queryd /sql is RCE-equivalent off
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// loopback, but the gate applies to every binary uniformly).
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func Run(serviceName, addr string, register RegisterRoutes) error {
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// Three startup gates apply in order:
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//
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// 1. requireLoopbackOrOverride — refuses non-loopback bind unless
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// LH_<SERVICE>_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK=1 is set. Closes the accidental
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// 0.0.0.0 deploy path for R-001.
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// 2. requireAuthOnNonLoopback — refuses non-loopback bind when
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// auth.token is empty. Mechanically prevents R-001 + R-007's
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// worst case: world-reachable bind with no auth layer.
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// 3. RequireAuth middleware — runs per-request on registered routes.
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// /health stays exempt (mounted on the outer router, before the
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// authed group).
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//
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// Per ADR-003: empty auth.token + empty allowed_ips → middleware is
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// a no-op. Smokes and proof harness keep working without setting
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// either.
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func Run(serviceName, addr string, register RegisterRoutes, auth AuthConfig) error {
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if err := requireLoopbackOrOverride(serviceName, addr); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := requireAuthOnNonLoopback(serviceName, addr, auth); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{
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Level: slog.LevelInfo,
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@@ -67,6 +81,8 @@ func Run(serviceName, addr string, register RegisterRoutes) error {
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r.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
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r.Use(slogRequest(logger))
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// /health stays on the outer router — public, no auth. Operators
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// rely on it for liveness probes that don't carry a token.
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r.Get("/health", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(HealthResponse{
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@@ -76,7 +92,13 @@ func Run(serviceName, addr string, register RegisterRoutes) error {
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})
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if register != nil {
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register(r)
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// Registered routes live inside an auth-gated group so
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// RequireAuth applies uniformly without per-handler wiring.
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// Empty auth → middleware is a no-op (group is transparent).
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r.Group(func(authed chi.Router) {
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authed.Use(RequireAuth(auth))
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register(authed)
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})
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}
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srv := &http.Server{
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