Phase D: AI-safe views — capability-surface projections over base data
Implements the llms3.com "AI-safe views" pattern: a named projection
that exposes only whitelisted columns, with optional row filter and
per-column redactions. AI agents (or Phase 13 roles) bind to the view;
they can never accidentally see PII even if they write raw SQL.
Schema (shared::types):
- AiView { name, base_dataset, columns: Vec<String>, row_filter,
column_redactions: HashMap<String, Redaction>, ... }
- Redaction enum: Null | Hash | Mask { keep_prefix, keep_suffix }
Catalog (catalogd::registry):
- put_view validates base dataset exists + columns non-empty
- Persists JSON at _catalog/views/{name}.json (sanitized name)
- rebuild() loads views alongside dataset manifests on startup
Query layer (queryd::context):
- build_context registers every AiView as a DataFusion view object
- Constructed SELECT applies whitelist projection, WHERE filter, and
redaction expressions per column
- Mask: substr(prefix) + repeat('*', mid_len) + substr(suffix)
- Hash: digest(value, 'sha256')
- Null: CAST(NULL AS VARCHAR) AS col
- DataFusion handles JOINs/aggregates over the view natively — it's a
real view, not a query rewrite
HTTP (catalogd::service):
- POST /catalog/views (create)
- GET /catalog/views (list)
- GET /catalog/views/{name} (full def)
- DELETE /catalog/views/{name}
End-to-end test on candidates (100K rows, 15 columns):
candidates_safe view:
columns: candidate_id, first_name, city, state, vertical,
skills, years_experience, status
row_filter: status != 'blocked'
redaction: candidate_id mask(prefix=3, suffix=2)
SELECT * FROM candidates_safe LIMIT 5
-> 8 columns only, candidate_id shown as "CAN******01"
(PII fields email/phone/last_name absent from result)
SELECT email FROM candidates_safe
-> fails (column not in projection)
SELECT email FROM candidates
-> succeeds (raw table still accessible by name —
Phase 13 access control is the gate, not the view itself)
Survives restart — view definitions reload from object storage.
Limits / not in MVP:
- View CANNOT shadow base table by name (DataFusion treats them as
separate identifiers; access control must restrict raw-table access)
- row_filter is treated as trusted SQL — operators must validate
before persisting; only authenticated admin path should call put_view
- Redaction expressions assume column is castable to VARCHAR; numeric
redactions could be misleading (a Hash on Int64 returns a hex string
that won't equi-join with another hash on the same value type)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ pub fn router(registry: Registry) -> Router {
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.route("/datasets/by-name/{name}/resync", post(resync_dataset))
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.route("/resync-missing", post(resync_all_missing))
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.route("/migrate-buckets", post(migrate_buckets))
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// Phase D: AI-safe views
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.route("/views", post(create_view).get(list_views))
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.route("/views/{name}", get(get_view).delete(delete_view))
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.with_state(registry)
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}
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@@ -205,3 +208,64 @@ async fn migrate_buckets(State(registry): State<Registry>) -> impl IntoResponse
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Err(e) => Err((StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, e)),
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}
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}
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// --- Phase D: AI-safe views ---
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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struct CreateViewRequest {
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name: String,
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base_dataset: String,
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columns: Vec<String>,
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#[serde(default)]
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row_filter: Option<String>,
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#[serde(default)]
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column_redactions: std::collections::HashMap<String, shared::types::Redaction>,
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#[serde(default)]
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description: String,
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#[serde(default)]
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created_by: String,
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}
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async fn create_view(
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State(registry): State<Registry>,
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Json(req): Json<CreateViewRequest>,
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) -> impl IntoResponse {
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let view = shared::types::AiView {
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name: req.name,
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base_dataset: req.base_dataset,
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columns: req.columns,
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row_filter: req.row_filter,
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column_redactions: req.column_redactions,
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created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
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created_by: req.created_by,
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description: req.description,
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};
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match registry.put_view(view).await {
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Ok(v) => Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(v))),
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Err(e) => Err((StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, e)),
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}
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}
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async fn list_views(State(registry): State<Registry>) -> impl IntoResponse {
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Json(registry.list_views().await)
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}
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async fn get_view(
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State(registry): State<Registry>,
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Path(name): Path<String>,
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) -> impl IntoResponse {
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match registry.get_view(&name).await {
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Some(v) => Ok(Json(v)),
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None => Err((StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, format!("view not found: {name}"))),
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}
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}
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async fn delete_view(
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State(registry): State<Registry>,
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Path(name): Path<String>,
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) -> impl IntoResponse {
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match registry.delete_view(&name).await {
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Ok(()) => Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT),
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Err(e) => Err((StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, e)),
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}
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}
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