Scrum iter 11 flagged crates/gateway/src/tools/service.rs with two
95%-confidence critical failures:
CF-1: "Direct SQL execution from model-provided parameters without
explicit validation or sanitization" (line 68, 95% conf)
CF-2: "No permission check performed before executing SQL query;
access control is bypassed entirely" (line 102, 90% conf)
CF-1 is the real one — same security gap as queryd /sql had before
P42-002 (9cc0ceb). Tool invocations build SQL from a template +
model-provided params, then state.query_fn.execute(&sql) runs it.
No truth-gate check between build and execute meant an adversarial
model could emit DROP TABLE / DELETE FROM / TRUNCATE inside a param
and bypass queryd's gate by routing through the tool surface instead.
Fix mirrors the queryd SQL gate exactly:
- ToolState grows an Arc<TruthStore> field
- main.rs constructs it via truth::sql_query_guard_store()
(shared default — same destructive-verb block as queryd)
- call_tool evaluates the built SQL against "sql_query" task class
BEFORE executing
- Any Reject/Block outcome → 403 FORBIDDEN + log_invocation row
marked success=false with the rule message
CF-2 (access control) is P13-001 territory — needs AccessControl
wiring into queryd first, still open. Flagged in memory.
Workspace warnings still at 0. Pattern is now:
queryd /sql → truth::sql_query_guard_store (9cc0ceb)
gateway /tools → truth::sql_query_guard_store (this commit)
execution_loop → truth::default_truth_store (51a1aa3)
All three surfaces that pipe SQL or spec-shaped data through to the
substrate now gate it. Any new SQL-executing surface should follow
the same pattern.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ToolRegistry: named tools with parameter validation and audit logging
- 6 built-in staffing tools:
search_candidates (skills, city, state, experience, availability)
get_candidate (by ID)
revenue_by_client (top N by billed revenue)
recruiter_performance (placements, revenue per recruiter)
cold_leads (called N+ times, never placed)
open_jobs (by vertical, city)
- Each tool: name, description, params, permission level (read/write/admin)
- SQL template with validated parameter substitution
- Full audit trail: every invocation logged with agent, params, result
- Endpoints: GET /tools (list), GET /tools/{name} (schema),
POST /tools/{name}/call (execute), GET /tools/audit (log)
- Per ADR-015: governed interface before raw SQL for agents
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
