Files
lakehouse/crates/gateway/src/tools/service.rs
T
rootandClaude Opus 4.7 6532938e85 gateway/tools: truth gate for model-provided SQL (iter 11 CF-1+CF-2)
Scrum iter 11 flagged crates/gateway/src/tools/service.rs with two
95%-confidence critical failures:

  CF-1: "Direct SQL execution from model-provided parameters without
         explicit validation or sanitization" (line 68, 95% conf)
  CF-2: "No permission check performed before executing SQL query;
         access control is bypassed entirely" (line 102, 90% conf)

CF-1 is the real one — same security gap as queryd /sql had before
P42-002 (9cc0ceb). Tool invocations build SQL from a template +
model-provided params, then state.query_fn.execute(&sql) runs it.
No truth-gate check between build and execute meant an adversarial
model could emit DROP TABLE / DELETE FROM / TRUNCATE inside a param
and bypass queryd's gate by routing through the tool surface instead.

Fix mirrors the queryd SQL gate exactly:
  - ToolState grows an Arc<TruthStore> field
  - main.rs constructs it via truth::sql_query_guard_store()
    (shared default — same destructive-verb block as queryd)
  - call_tool evaluates the built SQL against "sql_query" task class
    BEFORE executing
  - Any Reject/Block outcome → 403 FORBIDDEN + log_invocation row
    marked success=false with the rule message

CF-2 (access control) is P13-001 territory — needs AccessControl
wiring into queryd first, still open. Flagged in memory.

Workspace warnings still at 0. Pattern is now:
  queryd /sql        → truth::sql_query_guard_store (9cc0ceb)
  gateway /tools     → truth::sql_query_guard_store (this commit)
  execution_loop     → truth::default_truth_store (51a1aa3)
All three surfaces that pipe SQL or spec-shaped data through to the
substrate now gate it. Any new SQL-executing surface should follow
the same pattern.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-24 13:52:29 -05:00

175 lines
5.8 KiB
Rust

use axum::{
Json, Router,
extract::{Path, Query, State},
http::StatusCode,
response::IntoResponse,
routing::{get, post},
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use super::registry::{ToolInvocation, ToolRegistry};
use crate::tools::ToolState;
pub fn router(state: ToolState) -> Router {
Router::new()
.route("/", get(list_tools))
.route("/{name}", get(get_tool))
.route("/{name}/call", post(call_tool))
.route("/audit", get(audit_log))
.with_state(state)
}
/// List all available tools (for LLM tool-use discovery).
async fn list_tools(State(state): State<ToolState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
let tools = state.registry.list_tools().await;
// Return in MCP-compatible format
let tool_list: Vec<serde_json::Value> = tools.iter().map(|t| {
serde_json::json!({
"name": t.name,
"description": t.description,
"permission": t.permission,
"category": t.category,
"parameters": t.parameters.iter().map(|p| {
serde_json::json!({
"name": p.name,
"type": p.param_type,
"required": p.required,
"description": p.description,
"default": p.default,
})
}).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
})
}).collect();
Json(tool_list)
}
/// Get a specific tool definition.
async fn get_tool(
State(state): State<ToolState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
match state.registry.get_tool(&name).await {
Some(tool) => Ok(Json(tool)),
None => Err((StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, format!("tool not found: {name}"))),
}
}
/// Call a tool — validate params, execute SQL, log invocation.
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct CallRequest {
params: serde_json::Value,
agent: String,
}
async fn call_tool(
State(state): State<ToolState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(req): Json<CallRequest>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let tool = match state.registry.get_tool(&name).await {
Some(t) => t,
None => return Err((StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, format!("tool not found: {name}"))),
};
tracing::info!("tool call: {} by agent '{}' with {:?}", name, req.agent, req.params);
// Build SQL from params
let sql = match ToolRegistry::build_sql(&tool, &req.params) {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(e) => {
state.registry.log_invocation(ToolInvocation {
id: format!("inv-{}", chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis()),
tool_name: name.clone(),
agent: req.agent.clone(),
params: req.params.clone(),
permission: tool.permission.clone(),
timestamp: chrono::Utc::now(),
success: false,
error: Some(e.clone()),
rows_returned: None,
}).await;
return Err((StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, e));
}
};
// Truth gate — same contract as queryd /sql (P42-002). Rejects
// destructive verbs + empty SQL. Scrum iter 11 CF-1 + CF-2 on this
// file: tools executed model-provided SQL parameters without any
// validation. Close the gap here so the parallel surface has the
// same safety floor as queryd.
let ctx = serde_json::json!({ "sql": sql });
for outcome in state.truth.evaluate("sql_query", &ctx) {
if outcome.passed {
if let truth::RuleAction::Reject { message } | truth::RuleAction::Block { message } = &outcome.action {
tracing::warn!("tool {name}: SQL blocked by truth gate ({}): {message}", outcome.rule_id);
state.registry.log_invocation(ToolInvocation {
id: format!("inv-{}", chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis()),
tool_name: name.clone(),
agent: req.agent.clone(),
params: req.params.clone(),
permission: tool.permission.clone(),
timestamp: chrono::Utc::now(),
success: false,
error: Some(format!("truth gate: {message}")),
rows_returned: None,
}).await;
return Err((StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, message.clone()));
}
}
}
// Execute via query engine
let result = state.query_fn.execute(&sql).await;
match result {
Ok((rows, row_count)) => {
state.registry.log_invocation(ToolInvocation {
id: format!("inv-{}", chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis()),
tool_name: name.clone(),
agent: req.agent,
params: req.params,
permission: tool.permission,
timestamp: chrono::Utc::now(),
success: true,
error: None,
rows_returned: Some(row_count),
}).await;
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"tool": name,
"rows": rows,
"row_count": row_count,
"sql": sql,
})))
}
Err(e) => {
state.registry.log_invocation(ToolInvocation {
id: format!("inv-{}", chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis()),
tool_name: name,
agent: req.agent,
params: req.params,
permission: tool.permission,
timestamp: chrono::Utc::now(),
success: false,
error: Some(e.clone()),
rows_returned: None,
}).await;
Err((StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, e))
}
}
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct AuditQuery {
limit: Option<usize>,
}
async fn audit_log(
State(state): State<ToolState>,
Query(q): Query<AuditQuery>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let log = state.registry.recent_audit(q.limit.unwrap_or(50)).await;
Json(log)
}