Phase C — local-Ollama LLM review wired end-to-end

Implements PROMPT.md / docs/REVIEW_PIPELINE.md Phase 2: - internal/llm/ollama.go — real Ollama provider: - HealthCheck probes /api/tags + a 1-token completion + a JSON-mode probe ({"ok": true} round-trip), populating the model-doctor.json schema documented in docs/LOCAL_MODEL_SETUP.md - Complete + CompleteJSON via /api/chat with stream=false - think=false set for ALL completions (qwen3.5:latest is reasoning- capable but the inner-loop hot path wants direct answers, not reasoning traces consuming the token budget — same finding as the Lakehouse-Go chatd 2026-04-30 wave) - internal/llm/review.go — Reviewer wrapper: - 2-attempt flow: prompt → parse → repair-prompt → parse - Strict JSON shape enforced; markdown fences stripped before parse - Severity normalized to enum; out-of-range confidence clamped - Per-file chunking (file-level for v0; function-level Phase D+) - Bounded by review-profile max_file_bytes + max_llm_chunk_chars - pipeline.go — Phase 2 wired between static scan + report gen: - --enable-llm flag opts in (off by default — static-only is cheaper and faster) - Raw output ALWAYS saved to llm-findings.raw.json (forensics) - Normalized findings → llm-findings.normalized.json - LLM findings merged into the report findings list (sourced "llm" so consumers can filter) - Receipts honestly mark phase status: "ok" | "degraded" | "skipped" - cli model doctor — real probes replace the Phase A stub. Verified: - model doctor: status="ok" with qwen3.5:latest + qwen3:latest both loaded, basic_prompt_ok=true, json_mode_ok=true - insecure-repo with --enable-llm: 9 LLM findings; qwen3.5 correctly flagged SQLi, RCE, hardcoded credentials as critical with verbatim evidence; 27s wall for 3 chunks - clean-repo with --enable-llm: 0 LLM findings, 4 parsed chunks, 2.8s - self-review with --enable-llm: 77 LLM findings + 83 static; 3 of ~30 chunks needed retry (PROMPT.md, REPORT_SCHEMA.md, SCRUM_TEST_TEMPLATE.md — all eventually parsed); 5min wall go vet + go test -short clean. Fixture stray.go now `package fixture` so go-tooling doesn't choke on the orphan. Phase D (validator cross-check) + Phase E (memory + diff/rules subcommands) remain. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 01:13:39 -05:00
parent 70d68757f7
commit e346b54e0f
27 changed files with 1785 additions and 22 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Acceptance Gates
+
+Each gate must be testable. Format: command + verifiable post-condition.
+
+1. **Reproducibility:** `review-harness repo .` exits 0; `reports/latest/repo-intake.json` exists with non-zero `file_count`.
+2. **No false positives on a clean fixture:** `review-harness repo tests/fixtures/clean-repo` produces zero `confirmed` findings.
+3. **Every documented static check fires on the insecure fixture:** `jq '[.findings[] | .check_id] | unique | length' reports/latest/static-findings.json` ≥ 8.
+4. **Receipts are honest about degraded phases:** `jq '[.phases[] | select(.status == "degraded")]' reports/latest/receipts.json` lists every skipped/stubbed phase.
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Claim Coverage Table
+
+Each row is a finding paired with whether existing tests cover the affected area.
+Phase B emits this shape; LLM-side claim generation lands in Phase C.
+
+| Claim | Code Location | Existing Test | Missing Test | Risk |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| _no claims yet_ | — | — | — | — |
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "generated_at": "2026-04-30T06:06:56.669606679Z",
+  "findings": [],
+  "summary": {
+    "total": 0,
+    "confirmed": 0,
+    "suspected": 0,
+    "rejected": 0,
+    "critical": 0,
+    "high": 0,
+    "medium": 0,
+    "low": 0,
+    "by_source": {},
+    "by_check": {}
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+[
+  {
+    "chunk_id": "README.md",
+    "findings": [],
+    "raw_content": "{\"findings\": []}",
+    "parsed": true,
+    "retried": false
+  },
+  {
+    "chunk_id": "package.json",
+    "findings": [],
+    "raw_content": "{\"findings\": []}",
+    "parsed": true,
+    "retried": false
+  },
+  {
+    "chunk_id": "src/calc.ts",
+    "findings": [],
+    "raw_content": "{\"findings\": []}",
+    "parsed": true,
+    "retried": false
+  },
+  {
+    "chunk_id": "tests/calc.test.ts",
+    "findings": [],
+    "raw_content": "{\"findings\": []}",
+    "parsed": true,
+    "retried": false
+  }
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+{
+  "run_id": "20260430T060653-57461e2c",
+  "repo_path": "tests/fixtures/clean-repo",
+  "started_at": "2026-04-30T06:06:53.880883402Z",
+  "finished_at": "2026-04-30T06:06:56.669797363Z",
+  "phases": [
+    {
+      "name": "repo_intake",
+      "status": "ok",
+      "output_hash": "db312c5ce39315cd",
+      "output_files": [
+        "repo-intake.json"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "static_scan",
+      "status": "ok",
+      "output_hash": "837b6a5d9dc11126",
+      "output_files": [
+        "static-findings.json"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "llm_review",
+      "status": "ok",
+      "output_hash": "3939252dabe358b1",
+      "output_files": [
+        "llm-findings.raw.json",
+        "llm-findings.normalized.json"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "validation",
+      "status": "skipped",
+      "errors": [
+        "Phase D not implemented in MVP — depends on Phase C"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "report_generation",
+      "status": "ok",
+      "output_files": [
+        "scrum-test.md",
+        "risk-register.md",
+        "claim-coverage-table.md",
+        "sprint-backlog.md",
+        "acceptance-gates.md"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "memory_update",
+      "status": "skipped",
+      "errors": [
+        "Phase E not implemented in MVP"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "summary": {
+    "total": 0,
+    "confirmed": 0,
+    "suspected": 0,
+    "rejected": 0,
+    "critical": 0,
+    "high": 0,
+    "medium": 0,
+    "low": 0,
+    "by_source": {},
+    "by_check": {}
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+{
+  "repo_path": "/home/profit/share/local-review-harness-full-md/tests/fixtures/clean-repo",
+  "current_branch": "main",
+  "latest_commit": "70d68757f78ea722bf24585c73120c09d82c4fea",
+  "git_status": "M ../../../internal/cli/cli.go\n M ../../../internal/cli/repo.go\n M ../../../internal/pipeline/pipeline.go\n?? ../../../internal/llm/ollama.go\n?? ../../../internal/llm/review.go\n?? ../insecure-repo/reports/",
+  "has_git": true,
+  "file_count": 4,
+  "language_breakdown": {
+    "JSON": 1,
+    "Markdown": 1,
+    "TypeScript": 2
+  },
+  "largest_files": [
+    {
+      "path": "src/calc.ts",
+      "size": 206,
+      "lines": 7
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "tests/calc.test.ts",
+      "size": 198,
+      "lines": 4
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "README.md",
+      "size": 80,
+      "lines": 2
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "package.json",
+      "size": 43,
+      "lines": 1
+    }
+  ],
+  "dependency_manifests": [
+    "package.json"
+  ],
+  "test_manifests": [
+    "tests/calc.test.ts"
+  ],
+  "generated_at": "2026-04-30T06:06:53.895008668Z"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Risk Register
+
+Findings ranked by severity. `Suspected` rows haven't been validated yet (Phase D).
+
+_No findings._
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# Scrum Test — clean-repo
+
+**Generated:** 2026-04-30T06:06:53.895008668Z
+**Branch:** main · **Commit:** 70d68757f78ea722bf24585c73120c09d82c4fea
+
+## Verdict
+
+**production-ready** — static scan + LLM review found no issues. Re-validate after every wave.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- repo path: `/home/profit/share/local-review-harness-full-md/tests/fixtures/clean-repo`
+- file count: 4
+- languages: TypeScript (2), Markdown (1), JSON (1)
+- dependency manifests: 1 (package.json)
+- test files/dirs: 1
+
+## Confirmed Risks
+
+_No confirmed risks at static-scan level. (LLM review may surface more.)_
+
+## Suspected Risks
+
+_None._
+
+## Blocked Checks
+
+_None._
+
+## Sprint Backlog
+
+**Sprint 0 — Reproducibility Gate**
+
+- Wire `just verify` (or equivalent) to run the static checks before every commit/PR.
+- Add a CI step that fails on `critical` findings.
+
+**Sprint 1 — Trust Boundary Gate**
+
+- Confirm auth posture for any mutation endpoint flagged as exposed.
+- Replace raw SQL interpolation with parameterized queries.
+
+**Sprint 2 — Memory Correctness Gate**
+
+- (Phase E) Wire append-only `.memory/` writes for known-risks + fixed-patterns.
+- Add a regression test that re-runs the harness and asserts no regression in confirmed-finding count.
+
+**Sprint 3 — Agent Loop Reality Gate**
+
+- (Phase C) Wire local-Ollama LLM review.
+- (Phase D) Validator pass cross-checks every LLM finding against repo evidence.
+
+**Sprint 4 — Deployment Gate**
+
+- Ship the harness as a single static binary (`go build -o review-harness`).
+- Document operator runbook (model setup, profile editing, output retention).
+
+## Acceptance Gates
+
+Each gate must be testable. Format: command + verifiable post-condition.
+
+1. **Reproducibility:** `review-harness repo .` exits 0; `reports/latest/repo-intake.json` exists with non-zero `file_count`.
+2. **No false positives on a clean fixture:** `review-harness repo tests/fixtures/clean-repo` produces zero `confirmed` findings.
+3. **Every documented static check fires on the insecure fixture:** `jq '[.findings[] | .check_id] | unique | length' reports/latest/static-findings.json` ≥ 8.
+4. **Receipts are honest about degraded phases:** `jq '[.phases[] | select(.status == "degraded")]' reports/latest/receipts.json` lists every skipped/stubbed phase.
+
+## Next Commands
+
+- Re-run after fixes: `review-harness repo /home/profit/share/local-review-harness-full-md/tests/fixtures/clean-repo`
+- Generate the full Scrum bundle: `review-harness scrum /home/profit/share/local-review-harness-full-md/tests/fixtures/clean-repo`
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Sprint Backlog
+
+**Sprint 0 — Reproducibility Gate**
+
+- Wire `just verify` (or equivalent) to run the static checks before every commit/PR.
+- Add a CI step that fails on `critical` findings.
+
+**Sprint 1 — Trust Boundary Gate**
+
+- Confirm auth posture for any mutation endpoint flagged as exposed.
+- Replace raw SQL interpolation with parameterized queries.
+
+**Sprint 2 — Memory Correctness Gate**
+
+- (Phase E) Wire append-only `.memory/` writes for known-risks + fixed-patterns.
+- Add a regression test that re-runs the harness and asserts no regression in confirmed-finding count.
+
+**Sprint 3 — Agent Loop Reality Gate**
+
+- (Phase C) Wire local-Ollama LLM review.
+- (Phase D) Validator pass cross-checks every LLM finding against repo evidence.
+
+**Sprint 4 — Deployment Gate**
+
+- Ship the harness as a single static binary (`go build -o review-harness`).
+- Document operator runbook (model setup, profile editing, output retention).
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "generated_at": "2026-04-30T06:06:53.896533109Z",
+  "findings": [],
+  "summary": {
+    "total": 0,
+    "confirmed": 0,
+    "suspected": 0,
+    "rejected": 0,
+    "critical": 0,
+    "high": 0,
+    "medium": 0,
+    "low": 0,
+    "by_source": {},
+    "by_check": {}
+  }
+}
@@ -1 +1,7 @@
+// Fixture: orphan source file in a non-git directory. Exists so the
+// scanner has something to walk. Marked package fixture so `go vet`
+// over the harness's own module doesn't choke on the orphan; the
+// harness itself reads this file as raw text and doesn't care.
+package fixture
+
 // just a stray file
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Acceptance Gates
+
+Each gate must be testable. Format: command + verifiable post-condition.
+
+1. **Reproducibility:** `review-harness repo .` exits 0; `reports/latest/repo-intake.json` exists with non-zero `file_count`.
+2. **No false positives on a clean fixture:** `review-harness repo tests/fixtures/clean-repo` produces zero `confirmed` findings.
+3. **Every documented static check fires on the insecure fixture:** `jq '[.findings[] | .check_id] | unique | length' reports/latest/static-findings.json` ≥ 8.
+4. **Receipts are honest about degraded phases:** `jq '[.phases[] | select(.status == "degraded")]' reports/latest/receipts.json` lists every skipped/stubbed phase.
+5. **Critical findings block production deploy:** at least one critical finding is currently present; resolve before deploy.
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Claim Coverage Table
+
+Each row is a finding paired with whether existing tests cover the affected area.
+Phase B emits this shape; LLM-side claim generation lands in Phase C.
+
+| Claim | Code Location | Existing Test | Missing Test | Risk |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| Environment file in source tree | `.env:?` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | high |
+| Hardcoded absolute path | `src/handler.go:10` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | medium |
+| Shell command execution | `src/handler.go:19` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | high |
+| Raw SQL interpolation | `src/handler.go:14` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | high |
+| Possible secret committed to source | `src/handler.go:23` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | critical |
+| Possible secret committed to source | `src/handler.go:23` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | critical |
+| TODO/FIXME comment | `src/handler.go:9` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | low |
+| TODO/FIXME comment | `src/handler.go:22` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | low |
+| Hardcoded private-network IP | `src/handler.go:11` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | medium |
+| Large file | `src/huge.go:1-901` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | medium |
+| Wildcard CORS | `src/server.js:2` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | high |
+| Possible secret committed to source | `src/server.js:5` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | critical |
+| TODO/FIXME comment | `src/server.js:1` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | low |
+| Mutation route in file with no visible auth | `src/server.js:7` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | medium |
+| Mutation route in file with no visible auth | `src/server.js:8` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | medium |
+| No tests found | `.:?` | _unknown_ | _likely_ | medium |
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+{
+  "generated_at": "2026-04-30T06:06:33.240219171Z",
+  "findings": [
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "Hardcoded file path for secrets",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "10",
+      "evidence": "const HARDCODED_PATH = \"/home/profit/secrets/key.pem\"",
+      "reason": "Hardcoding a file path for a private key exposes secrets and prevents proper secret management.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Move the path to an environment variable or a configuration file outside the source code.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "Hardcoded server IP address",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "11",
+      "evidence": "const SERVER_IP = \"192.168.1.176\"",
+      "reason": "Hardcoding an IP address reduces portability and may leak internal network topology.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Read the server IP from an environment variable.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "SQL Injection vulnerability",
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "15-16",
+      "evidence": "q := fmt.Sprintf(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'\", name)\ndb.Query(q)",
+      "reason": "Using string formatting to construct SQL queries directly exposes the application to SQL injection attacks.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Use parameterized queries with placeholders instead of string formatting.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "Unsafe shell command execution",
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "19-20",
+      "evidence": "exec.Command(\"bash\", \"-c\", cmd).Run()",
+      "reason": "Executing arbitrary shell commands without validation allows for remote code execution.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Validate and sanitize the input command strictly, or avoid using shell execution entirely.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "Hardcoded API key",
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "23",
+      "evidence": "const API_KEY = \"sk-1234567890abcdefABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV\"",
+      "reason": "Hardcoding an API key in source code exposes sensitive credentials to anyone with access to the repository.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Store the API key in a secure environment variable or secrets manager.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "CORS misconfiguration allows cross-origin attacks",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "2",
+      "evidence": "res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\");",
+      "reason": "Allowing all origins (*) exposes the API to cross-site request forgery and data theft from any website.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Restrict Access-Control-Allow-Origin to specific trusted domains or use credentials with a specific origin.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "Hardcoded AWS access key in source code",
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "5",
+      "evidence": "const AWS_KEY = \"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\";",
+      "reason": "Hardcoded credentials in source code pose a severe security risk as they can be easily leaked and misused.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Use environment variables or a secure secrets manager to store AWS credentials.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "Missing authentication on user creation endpoint",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "7",
+      "evidence": "app.post(\"/api/users\", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });",
+      "reason": "The /api/users endpoint lacks authentication, allowing anyone to create or modify user accounts.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Implement authentication middleware to verify user identity before allowing POST requests.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "",
+      "title": "Missing authentication on admin deletion endpoint",
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "8",
+      "evidence": "app.delete(\"/api/admin\", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });",
+      "reason": "The /api/admin endpoint lacks authentication, allowing unauthenticated users to delete administrative resources.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Implement strict authentication and authorization checks for all admin endpoints.",
+      "source": "llm",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "llm.review"
+    }
+  ],
+  "summary": {
+    "total": 9,
+    "confirmed": 0,
+    "suspected": 9,
+    "rejected": 0,
+    "critical": 5,
+    "high": 3,
+    "medium": 1,
+    "low": 0,
+    "by_source": {
+      "llm": 9
+    },
+    "by_check": {
+      "llm.review": 9
+    }
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+[
+  {
+    "chunk_id": "src/handler.go",
+    "findings": [
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "Hardcoded file path for secrets",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/handler.go",
+        "line_hint": "10",
+        "evidence": "const HARDCODED_PATH = \"/home/profit/secrets/key.pem\"",
+        "reason": "Hardcoding a file path for a private key exposes secrets and prevents proper secret management.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Move the path to an environment variable or a configuration file outside the source code.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "Hardcoded server IP address",
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/handler.go",
+        "line_hint": "11",
+        "evidence": "const SERVER_IP = \"192.168.1.176\"",
+        "reason": "Hardcoding an IP address reduces portability and may leak internal network topology.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Read the server IP from an environment variable.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "SQL Injection vulnerability",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/handler.go",
+        "line_hint": "15-16",
+        "evidence": "q := fmt.Sprintf(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'\", name)\ndb.Query(q)",
+        "reason": "Using string formatting to construct SQL queries directly exposes the application to SQL injection attacks.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Use parameterized queries with placeholders instead of string formatting.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "Unsafe shell command execution",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/handler.go",
+        "line_hint": "19-20",
+        "evidence": "exec.Command(\"bash\", \"-c\", cmd).Run()",
+        "reason": "Executing arbitrary shell commands without validation allows for remote code execution.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Validate and sanitize the input command strictly, or avoid using shell execution entirely.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "Hardcoded API key",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/handler.go",
+        "line_hint": "23",
+        "evidence": "const API_KEY = \"sk-1234567890abcdefABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV\"",
+        "reason": "Hardcoding an API key in source code exposes sensitive credentials to anyone with access to the repository.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Store the API key in a secure environment variable or secrets manager.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      }
+    ],
+    "raw_content": "{\n  \"findings\": [\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Hardcoded file path for secrets\",\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"src/handler.go\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"10\",\n      \"evidence\": \"const HARDCODED_PATH = \\\"/home/profit/secrets/key.pem\\\"\",\n      \"reason\": \"Hardcoding a file path for a private key exposes secrets and prevents proper secret management.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Move the path to an environment variable or a configuration file outside the source code.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Hardcoded server IP address\",\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"src/handler.go\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"11\",\n      \"evidence\": \"const SERVER_IP = \\\"192.168.1.176\\\"\",\n      \"reason\": \"Hardcoding an IP address reduces portability and may leak internal network topology.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Read the server IP from an environment variable.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"SQL Injection vulnerability\",\n      \"severity\": \"critical\",\n      \"file\": \"src/handler.go\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"15-16\",\n      \"evidence\": \"q := fmt.Sprintf(\\\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'\\\", name)\\ndb.Query(q)\",\n      \"reason\": \"Using string formatting to construct SQL queries directly exposes the application to SQL injection attacks.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Use parameterized queries with placeholders instead of string formatting.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Unsafe shell command execution\",\n      \"severity\": \"critical\",\n      \"file\": \"src/handler.go\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"19-20\",\n      \"evidence\": \"exec.Command(\\\"bash\\\", \\\"-c\\\", cmd).Run()\",\n      \"reason\": \"Executing arbitrary shell commands without validation allows for remote code execution.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Validate and sanitize the input command strictly, or avoid using shell execution entirely.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Hardcoded API key\",\n      \"severity\": \"critical\",\n      \"file\": \"src/handler.go\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"23\",\n      \"evidence\": \"const API_KEY = \\\"sk-1234567890abcdefABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV\\\"\",\n      \"reason\": \"Hardcoding an API key in source code exposes sensitive credentials to anyone with access to the repository.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Store the API key in a secure environment variable or secrets manager.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    }\n  ]\n}",
+    "parsed": true,
+    "retried": false
+  },
+  {
+    "chunk_id": "src/huge.go",
+    "findings": [],
+    "raw_content": "```json\n{\n  \"error\": \"No valid content found. The input appears to be a list of generated line markers without any actual text or data to process.\",\n  \"status\": \"empty_input\"\n}\n```",
+    "parsed": true,
+    "retried": false
+  },
+  {
+    "chunk_id": "src/server.js",
+    "findings": [
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "CORS misconfiguration allows cross-origin attacks",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/server.js",
+        "line_hint": "2",
+        "evidence": "res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\");",
+        "reason": "Allowing all origins (*) exposes the API to cross-site request forgery and data theft from any website.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Restrict Access-Control-Allow-Origin to specific trusted domains or use credentials with a specific origin.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "Hardcoded AWS access key in source code",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/server.js",
+        "line_hint": "5",
+        "evidence": "const AWS_KEY = \"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\";",
+        "reason": "Hardcoded credentials in source code pose a severe security risk as they can be easily leaked and misused.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Use environment variables or a secure secrets manager to store AWS credentials.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "Missing authentication on user creation endpoint",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/server.js",
+        "line_hint": "7",
+        "evidence": "app.post(\"/api/users\", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });",
+        "reason": "The /api/users endpoint lacks authentication, allowing anyone to create or modify user accounts.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Implement authentication middleware to verify user identity before allowing POST requests.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "",
+        "title": "Missing authentication on admin deletion endpoint",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "status": "suspected",
+        "file": "src/server.js",
+        "line_hint": "8",
+        "evidence": "app.delete(\"/api/admin\", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });",
+        "reason": "The /api/admin endpoint lacks authentication, allowing unauthenticated users to delete administrative resources.",
+        "suggested_fix": "Implement strict authentication and authorization checks for all admin endpoints.",
+        "source": "llm",
+        "confidence": 1,
+        "check_id": "llm.review"
+      }
+    ],
+    "raw_content": "{\n  \"findings\": [\n    {\n      \"title\": \"CORS misconfiguration allows cross-origin attacks\",\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"src/server.js\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"2\",\n      \"evidence\": \"res.setHeader(\\\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\\\", \\\"*\\\");\",\n      \"reason\": \"Allowing all origins (*) exposes the API to cross-site request forgery and data theft from any website.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Restrict Access-Control-Allow-Origin to specific trusted domains or use credentials with a specific origin.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Hardcoded AWS access key in source code\",\n      \"severity\": \"critical\",\n      \"file\": \"src/server.js\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"5\",\n      \"evidence\": \"const AWS_KEY = \\\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\\\";\",\n      \"reason\": \"Hardcoded credentials in source code pose a severe security risk as they can be easily leaked and misused.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Use environment variables or a secure secrets manager to store AWS credentials.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Missing authentication on user creation endpoint\",\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"src/server.js\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"7\",\n      \"evidence\": \"app.post(\\\"/api/users\\\", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });\",\n      \"reason\": \"The /api/users endpoint lacks authentication, allowing anyone to create or modify user accounts.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Implement authentication middleware to verify user identity before allowing POST requests.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    },\n    {\n      \"title\": \"Missing authentication on admin deletion endpoint\",\n      \"severity\": \"critical\",\n      \"file\": \"src/server.js\",\n      \"line_hint\": \"8\",\n      \"evidence\": \"app.delete(\\\"/api/admin\\\", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });\",\n      \"reason\": \"The /api/admin endpoint lacks authentication, allowing unauthenticated users to delete administrative resources.\",\n      \"suggested_fix\": \"Implement strict authentication and authorization checks for all admin endpoints.\",\n      \"confidence\": 1.0\n    }\n  ]\n}",
+    "parsed": true,
+    "retried": false
+  }
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+{
+  "run_id": "20260430T060713-f513f6dc",
+  "repo_path": "tests/fixtures/insecure-repo",
+  "started_at": "2026-04-30T06:07:13.917781613Z",
+  "finished_at": "2026-04-30T06:07:13.953011207Z",
+  "phases": [
+    {
+      "name": "repo_intake",
+      "status": "ok",
+      "output_hash": "540f222456204a27",
+      "output_files": [
+        "repo-intake.json"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "static_scan",
+      "status": "ok",
+      "output_hash": "a7aeccbda6841c1e",
+      "output_files": [
+        "static-findings.json"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "llm_review",
+      "status": "skipped",
+      "errors": [
+        "LLM review not requested (pass --enable-llm to opt in)"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "validation",
+      "status": "skipped",
+      "errors": [
+        "Phase D not implemented in MVP — depends on Phase C"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "report_generation",
+      "status": "ok",
+      "output_files": [
+        "scrum-test.md",
+        "risk-register.md",
+        "claim-coverage-table.md",
+        "sprint-backlog.md",
+        "acceptance-gates.md"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "memory_update",
+      "status": "skipped",
+      "errors": [
+        "Phase E not implemented in MVP"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "summary": {
+    "total": 16,
+    "confirmed": 2,
+    "suspected": 14,
+    "rejected": 0,
+    "critical": 3,
+    "high": 4,
+    "medium": 6,
+    "low": 3,
+    "by_source": {
+      "static": 16
+    },
+    "by_check": {
+      "static.broad_cors": 1,
+      "static.env_file_committed": 1,
+      "static.exposed_mutation_endpoint": 2,
+      "static.hardcoded_local_ip": 1,
+      "static.hardcoded_paths": 1,
+      "static.large_files": 1,
+      "static.missing_tests": 1,
+      "static.raw_sql_interpolation": 1,
+      "static.secret_patterns": 3,
+      "static.shell_execution": 1,
+      "static.todo_comments": 3
+    }
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+  "repo_path": "/home/profit/share/local-review-harness-full-md/tests/fixtures/insecure-repo",
+  "current_branch": "main",
+  "latest_commit": "70d68757f78ea722bf24585c73120c09d82c4fea",
+  "git_status": "M ../../../internal/cli/cli.go\n M ../../../internal/cli/repo.go\n M ../../../internal/pipeline/pipeline.go\n?? ../../../internal/llm/ollama.go\n?? ../../../internal/llm/review.go\n?? ../clean-repo/reports/\n?? reports/",
+  "has_git": true,
+  "file_count": 4,
+  "language_breakdown": {
+    "Go": 2,
+    "JavaScript": 1
+  },
+  "largest_files": [
+    {
+      "path": "src/huge.go",
+      "size": 19705,
+      "lines": 901
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "src/handler.go",
+      "size": 462,
+      "lines": 23
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "src/server.js",
+      "size": 286,
+      "lines": 8
+    },
+    {
+      "path": ".env",
+      "size": 59,
+      "lines": 2
+    }
+  ],
+  "dependency_manifests": null,
+  "test_manifests": null,
+  "generated_at": "2026-04-30T06:07:13.931830669Z"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Risk Register
+
+Findings ranked by severity. `Suspected` rows haven't been validated yet (Phase D).
+
+| ID | Severity | Status | File | Line | Title |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `9bc97c579efc` | critical | suspected | `src/handler.go` | 23 | Possible secret committed to source |
+| `9bc97c579efc` | critical | suspected | `src/handler.go` | 23 | Possible secret committed to source |
+| `d3c2c5606e1d` | critical | suspected | `src/server.js` | 5 | Possible secret committed to source |
+| `750676119e4a` | high | confirmed | `.env` | — | Environment file in source tree |
+| `3a198539c923` | high | suspected | `src/handler.go` | 14 | Raw SQL interpolation |
+| `5bf85ae888a0` | high | suspected | `src/handler.go` | 19 | Shell command execution |
+| `ef8bb39704d3` | high | suspected | `src/server.js` | 2 | Wildcard CORS |
+| `4d59806aeb57` | medium | confirmed | `.` | — | No tests found |
+| `eb3c41b3a186` | medium | suspected | `src/handler.go` | 10 | Hardcoded absolute path |
+| `bb70e8e262d6` | medium | suspected | `src/handler.go` | 11 | Hardcoded private-network IP |
+| `512b795dc551` | medium | suspected | `src/huge.go` | 1-901 | Large file |
+| `7ed1cab08825` | medium | suspected | `src/server.js` | 7 | Mutation route in file with no visible auth |
+| `2b765c240c96` | medium | suspected | `src/server.js` | 8 | Mutation route in file with no visible auth |
+| `f99cd5bb5f2c` | low | suspected | `src/handler.go` | 22 | TODO/FIXME comment |
+| `f3e510b70ec9` | low | suspected | `src/handler.go` | 9 | TODO/FIXME comment |
+| `4a631055edd1` | low | suspected | `src/server.js` | 1 | TODO/FIXME comment |
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Scrum Test — insecure-repo
+
+**Generated:** 2026-04-30T06:07:13.931830669Z
+**Branch:** main · **Commit:** 70d68757f78ea722bf24585c73120c09d82c4fea
+
+## Verdict
+
+**blocked** — critical-severity finding present. See Confirmed Risks; rotate any leaked credentials, then re-run.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- repo path: `/home/profit/share/local-review-harness-full-md/tests/fixtures/insecure-repo`
+- file count: 4
+- languages: Go (2), JavaScript (1)
+- dependency manifests: 0 ()
+- test files/dirs: 0
+- LLM review: **skipped** (Phase C not implemented OR provider unavailable; see model-doctor.json)
+
+## Confirmed Risks
+
+| Severity | File:Line | Title | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| high | `.env` | Environment file in source tree | `filename=.env` |
+| medium | `.` | No tests found | `No test files or test directories detected (looked for *_test.go, *.test.{js,ts}, test_*.py, tests/, spec/)` |
+
+## Suspected Risks
+
+Each entry is a static-scan regex hit awaiting validation (Phase D / LLM cross-check).
+
+| Severity | File:Line | Title | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| critical | `src/handler.go:23` | Possible secret committed to source | `const API_KEY = "sk-1234567890abcdefABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV"` |
+| critical | `src/handler.go:23` | Possible secret committed to source | `const API_KEY = "sk-1234567890abcdefABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV"` |
+| critical | `src/server.js:5` | Possible secret committed to source | `const AWS_KEY = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE";` |
+| high | `src/handler.go:14` | Raw SQL interpolation | `q := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'", name)` |
+| high | `src/handler.go:19` | Shell command execution | `exec.Command("bash", "-c", cmd).Run()` |
+| high | `src/server.js:2` | Wildcard CORS | `res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");` |
+| medium | `src/handler.go:10` | Hardcoded absolute path | `const HARDCODED_PATH = "/home/profit/secrets/key.pem"` |
+| medium | `src/handler.go:11` | Hardcoded private-network IP | `const SERVER_IP = "192.168.1.176"` |
+| medium | `src/huge.go:1-901` | Large file | `901 lines (limit: 800)` |
+| medium | `src/server.js:7` | Mutation route in file with no visible auth | `app.post("/api/users", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });` |
+| medium | `src/server.js:8` | Mutation route in file with no visible auth | `app.delete("/api/admin", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });` |
+| low | `src/handler.go:22` | TODO/FIXME comment | `// FIXME: hardcoded creds` |
+| low | `src/handler.go:9` | TODO/FIXME comment | `// TODO: rotate this and move to env` |
+| low | `src/server.js:1` | TODO/FIXME comment | `// HACK: open CORS for now` |
+
+## Blocked Checks
+
+- LLM review (Phase 2 in REVIEW_PIPELINE.md). Reason: provider unavailable or stub. Next command: `review-harness model doctor`
+
+## Sprint Backlog
+
+**Sprint 0 — Reproducibility Gate**
+
+- Wire `just verify` (or equivalent) to run the static checks before every commit/PR.
+- Add a CI step that fails on `critical` findings.
+- Triage the 16 findings emitted by this run; mark each as accepted / blocking / dismiss-with-reason.
+
+**Sprint 1 — Trust Boundary Gate**
+
+- Resolve every `critical` and `high` finding before non-loopback deploy.
+- Confirm auth posture for any mutation endpoint flagged as exposed.
+- Replace raw SQL interpolation with parameterized queries.
+
+**Sprint 2 — Memory Correctness Gate**
+
+- (Phase E) Wire append-only `.memory/` writes for known-risks + fixed-patterns.
+- Add a regression test that re-runs the harness and asserts no regression in confirmed-finding count.
+
+**Sprint 3 — Agent Loop Reality Gate**
+
+- (Phase C) Wire local-Ollama LLM review.
+- (Phase D) Validator pass cross-checks every LLM finding against repo evidence.
+
+**Sprint 4 — Deployment Gate**
+
+- Ship the harness as a single static binary (`go build -o review-harness`).
+- Document operator runbook (model setup, profile editing, output retention).
+
+## Acceptance Gates
+
+Each gate must be testable. Format: command + verifiable post-condition.
+
+1. **Reproducibility:** `review-harness repo .` exits 0; `reports/latest/repo-intake.json` exists with non-zero `file_count`.
+2. **No false positives on a clean fixture:** `review-harness repo tests/fixtures/clean-repo` produces zero `confirmed` findings.
+3. **Every documented static check fires on the insecure fixture:** `jq '[.findings[] | .check_id] | unique | length' reports/latest/static-findings.json` ≥ 8.
+4. **Receipts are honest about degraded phases:** `jq '[.phases[] | select(.status == "degraded")]' reports/latest/receipts.json` lists every skipped/stubbed phase.
+5. **Critical findings block production deploy:** at least one critical finding is currently present; resolve before deploy.
+
+## Next Commands
+
+1. Open the risk register: `cat reports/latest/risk-register.md`
+2. Triage every `critical` finding; rotate any leaked credentials immediately.
+- Probe the model provider: `review-harness model doctor`
+- Re-run after fixes: `review-harness repo /home/profit/share/local-review-harness-full-md/tests/fixtures/insecure-repo`
+- Generate the full Scrum bundle: `review-harness scrum /home/profit/share/local-review-harness-full-md/tests/fixtures/insecure-repo`
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Sprint Backlog
+
+**Sprint 0 — Reproducibility Gate**
+
+- Wire `just verify` (or equivalent) to run the static checks before every commit/PR.
+- Add a CI step that fails on `critical` findings.
+- Triage the 16 findings emitted by this run; mark each as accepted / blocking / dismiss-with-reason.
+
+**Sprint 1 — Trust Boundary Gate**
+
+- Resolve every `critical` and `high` finding before non-loopback deploy.
+- Confirm auth posture for any mutation endpoint flagged as exposed.
+- Replace raw SQL interpolation with parameterized queries.
+
+**Sprint 2 — Memory Correctness Gate**
+
+- (Phase E) Wire append-only `.memory/` writes for known-risks + fixed-patterns.
+- Add a regression test that re-runs the harness and asserts no regression in confirmed-finding count.
+
+**Sprint 3 — Agent Loop Reality Gate**
+
+- (Phase C) Wire local-Ollama LLM review.
+- (Phase D) Validator pass cross-checks every LLM finding against repo evidence.
+
+**Sprint 4 — Deployment Gate**
+
+- Ship the harness as a single static binary (`go build -o review-harness`).
+- Document operator runbook (model setup, profile editing, output retention).
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+{
+  "generated_at": "2026-04-30T06:07:13.951970576Z",
+  "findings": [
+    {
+      "id": "750676119e4a",
+      "title": "Environment file in source tree",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "confirmed",
+      "file": ".env",
+      "evidence": "filename=.env",
+      "reason": ".env files commonly hold real secrets and should not be tracked. If this is a sample, rename to .env.example with placeholder values.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Rename to .env.example with placeholders; add .env to .gitignore; rotate any committed secrets.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.9,
+      "check_id": "static.env_file_committed"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "eb3c41b3a186",
+      "title": "Hardcoded absolute path",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "10",
+      "evidence": "const HARDCODED_PATH = \"/home/profit/secrets/key.pem\"",
+      "reason": "Absolute path encoded in source — couples the binary to one filesystem layout. Move to config or env var.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.7,
+      "check_id": "static.hardcoded_paths"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "5bf85ae888a0",
+      "title": "Shell command execution",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "19",
+      "evidence": "exec.Command(\"bash\", \"-c\", cmd).Run()",
+      "reason": "Direct subprocess/shell invocation. Confirm inputs are sanitized; prefer typed APIs over string-built commands.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.6,
+      "check_id": "static.shell_execution"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "3a198539c923",
+      "title": "Raw SQL interpolation",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "14",
+      "evidence": "q := fmt.Sprintf(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'\", name)",
+      "reason": "SQL assembled via string formatting/concatenation rather than parameterized query. Verify inputs aren't user-controlled.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Use parameterized queries / prepared statements; pass values via driver placeholders, not string interpolation.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.6,
+      "check_id": "static.raw_sql_interpolation"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "9bc97c579efc",
+      "title": "Possible secret committed to source",
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "23",
+      "evidence": "const API_KEY = \"sk-1234567890abcdefABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV\"",
+      "reason": "OpenAI/OpenRouter-shaped key detected. If real, rotate immediately and move to a secret store.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Move secret to env var / secret manager; commit the .env.example with a placeholder; rotate the leaked credential.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.75,
+      "check_id": "static.secret_patterns"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "9bc97c579efc",
+      "title": "Possible secret committed to source",
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "23",
+      "evidence": "const API_KEY = \"sk-1234567890abcdefABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV\"",
+      "reason": "Hardcoded credential pattern detected. If real, rotate immediately and move to a secret store.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Move secret to env var / secret manager; commit the .env.example with a placeholder; rotate the leaked credential.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.75,
+      "check_id": "static.secret_patterns"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "f3e510b70ec9",
+      "title": "TODO/FIXME comment",
+      "severity": "low",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "9",
+      "evidence": "// TODO: rotate this and move to env",
+      "reason": "Inline marker for deferred work. Audit whether the deferred concern is now blocking.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.95,
+      "check_id": "static.todo_comments"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "f99cd5bb5f2c",
+      "title": "TODO/FIXME comment",
+      "severity": "low",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "22",
+      "evidence": "// FIXME: hardcoded creds",
+      "reason": "Inline marker for deferred work. Audit whether the deferred concern is now blocking.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.95,
+      "check_id": "static.todo_comments"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "bb70e8e262d6",
+      "title": "Hardcoded private-network IP",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/handler.go",
+      "line_hint": "11",
+      "evidence": "const SERVER_IP = \"192.168.1.176\"",
+      "reason": "RFC 1918 / link-local IP literal in source. Move to config so the binary isn't tied to one network.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.7,
+      "check_id": "static.hardcoded_local_ip"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "512b795dc551",
+      "title": "Large file",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/huge.go",
+      "line_hint": "1-901",
+      "evidence": "901 lines (limit: 800)",
+      "reason": "File exceeds the configured size threshold. Long files are a refactor target — split by responsibility.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 1,
+      "check_id": "static.large_files"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "ef8bb39704d3",
+      "title": "Wildcard CORS",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "2",
+      "evidence": "res.setHeader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\");",
+      "reason": "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * permits cross-origin reads from any domain. Narrow to an explicit allowlist unless this endpoint is intentionally public.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.85,
+      "check_id": "static.broad_cors"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "d3c2c5606e1d",
+      "title": "Possible secret committed to source",
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "5",
+      "evidence": "const AWS_KEY = \"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\";",
+      "reason": "AWS access key ID detected. If real, rotate immediately and move to a secret store.",
+      "suggested_fix": "Move secret to env var / secret manager; commit the .env.example with a placeholder; rotate the leaked credential.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.75,
+      "check_id": "static.secret_patterns"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "4a631055edd1",
+      "title": "TODO/FIXME comment",
+      "severity": "low",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "1",
+      "evidence": "// HACK: open CORS for now",
+      "reason": "Inline marker for deferred work. Audit whether the deferred concern is now blocking.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.95,
+      "check_id": "static.todo_comments"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "7ed1cab08825",
+      "title": "Mutation route in file with no visible auth",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "7",
+      "evidence": "app.post(\"/api/users\", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });",
+      "reason": "POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH route registered in a file with no visible auth middleware. May still be auth'd at a higher layer — confirm.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.4,
+      "check_id": "static.exposed_mutation_endpoint"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "2b765c240c96",
+      "title": "Mutation route in file with no visible auth",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "status": "suspected",
+      "file": "src/server.js",
+      "line_hint": "8",
+      "evidence": "app.delete(\"/api/admin\", function(req, res) { /* no auth */ });",
+      "reason": "POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH route registered in a file with no visible auth middleware. May still be auth'd at a higher layer — confirm.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.4,
+      "check_id": "static.exposed_mutation_endpoint"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "4d59806aeb57",
+      "title": "No tests found",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "status": "confirmed",
+      "file": ".",
+      "evidence": "No test files or test directories detected (looked for *_test.go, *.test.{js,ts}, test_*.py, tests/, spec/)",
+      "reason": "Repository has source code but no test surface. Refactoring or extending without test cover is high-risk.",
+      "source": "static",
+      "confidence": 0.95,
+      "check_id": "static.missing_tests"
+    }
+  ],
+  "summary": {
+    "total": 16,
+    "confirmed": 2,
+    "suspected": 14,
+    "rejected": 0,
+    "critical": 3,
+    "high": 4,
+    "medium": 6,
+    "low": 3,
+    "by_source": {
+      "static": 16
+    },
+    "by_check": {
+      "static.broad_cors": 1,
+      "static.env_file_committed": 1,
+      "static.exposed_mutation_endpoint": 2,
+      "static.hardcoded_local_ip": 1,
+      "static.hardcoded_paths": 1,
+      "static.large_files": 1,
+      "static.missing_tests": 1,
+      "static.raw_sql_interpolation": 1,
+      "static.secret_patterns": 3,
+      "static.shell_execution": 1,
+      "static.todo_comments": 3
+    }
+  }
+}